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PREFACE: NETWORKS AND COMMUNITIES—
PROMISES AND QUESTIONS
The Internet is often referred to as a “network of networks.”1
Usually, this definition refers to the technical infrastructure that
facilitates the Internet’s ability to transfer data at great speed and
from distant locations through a resilient pathway.2 However, the
Internet also creates social networks of individuals interacting with
each other. In doing so, it generates and maintains relationships of
varying strengths. These social networks thrive on the existing
technological infrastructure and are enhanced by novel social
phenomena.
Online social networks permit a variety of interactions, from
aimless chatter to the exchange of offensive and obscene materials.
They also allow meaningful and important exchanges among
diverse parties. Such information exchanges facilitate an effective
and efficient distribution of data and content. Furthermore, they
facilitate the creation of novel forms of content, both simple and
complex. While it is true that these social interactions (and the
data flows they support) take place in the general Internet context
as well, social networks, provide several important benefits. They
increase user participation, as well effectively filtering and
accrediting information. Accordingly, they generate a reliable and
sustainable flow of information and content.
In recent years online social networks (as well as their close
relative, online communities)3 have grown in expanse, complexity,
popularity, and recognition, even beyond the realm of internetsavvy users. Websites that support and construct these networks
have soared in value4 and have become coveted targets for
1

See, e.g., William H. Dutton, Professor of Internet Studies, Oxford Internet Institute,
Through the Network (of Networks)—The Fifth Estate 6 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at
http://people.oii.ox.ac.uk/dutton/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/5th-estate-lecture-text.pdf.
2
See, e.g., Internet, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet (last visited Nov.
29, 2007).
3
Various commentators address these terms differently, though it appears that the
term “online social networks” emphasizes the existence of relations among the users
themselves. I thank Beth Noveck for this distinction.
4
Kevin J. Delaney, Robert A. Guth & Vauhini Vara, Microsoft Fires Volley at Google
in Ad Battle, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB119065193646437586.html (reporting that Microsoft is considering offering between
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takeovers by media moguls.5 They are closely linked to the “Web
2.0” phenomenon,6 which spotlights online interactions among and
contributions by, the users themselves. These websites now hold
the leading positions in popularity rankings,7 and are often
addressed in the mass media.8 Understandably, they generate a
great deal of interest among the academic community.9
Scholarship in the fields of sociology, economics, psychology, and
law is devoted to understanding the inner workings of these
networks, and their implications, benefits and disadvantages.10 It
is these implications that this Article intends briefly to address and
review. This analysis is far from merely theoretical, and has
important practical implications. As the popularity of these
networks grows, courts, regulators, and legislators will be called
upon to address the networks’ inner dynamics. This Article strives
to provide preliminary tools for dealing with these looming legal
and policy challenges.

$300 million to $500 million for a five percent stake in Facebook.) The high end of that
range would value Facebook as a whole at $10 billion.
5
News Corp in $580m Internet Buy, BBC NEWS, July 19, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4695495.stm (reporting that News Corp., which is
owned and headed by media mogul Rupert Murdoch, paid $580 million for Myspace.com
in 2005).
6
Web 2.0, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0 (last visited Nov. 30,
2007).
7
Alexa Traffic Ranking on November 7, 2007 shows several “Web 2.0” websites in
leading positions, such as youtube.com (#4), myspace.com (#6) and facebook.com (#7).
This is without referring to the search engines that dominate the list and might be
considered such sites as well; http://www.alexa.com (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
8
For one famous example, see Lev Grossman, Time’s Person of the Year, TIME, Dec.
13, 2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,
00.html.
9
A search on the Oxford website for articles dealing with social networks indicates
numerous academic writings, from a wide spectrum of academic fields, concerning this
issue. University of Oxford, http://www.ox.ac.uk (entering term “social networks” in
search field yields over 1500 results) (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
10
Virtual worlds, merely a subset of this issue, have generated a great variety of legal
literature. See, e.g., THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW GAMES AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack Balkin
& Beth Simone Noveck eds., New York University Press 2006) [hereinafter BALKIN &
NOVECK]; F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (2004); Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to
Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VIRGINIA L. R. 2043 (2004). Leandra Lederman, “Stranger
than Fiction”: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV 1620 (2007).
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Within the broad notion and topic of online social networks,
this Article strives to tackle three tasks. In Part I, I define online
social networks and address their overall evolution. I then
demonstrate the various dynamics occurring within the confines of
these networks. Thereafter, I address several challenges these
networks and their participants face when striving to assure a flow
of meaningful and accurate information. Next, I turn to the
technological and social tools used to face these challenges, with
mixed success. In Part II, I point to several important and specific
social dynamics which these platforms make possible, the
outcomes of such dynamics (when indeed successful), and their
intriguing legal and policy ramifications. Here I focus on the
effects on regulatory frameworks addressing consumer protection
and the structure of the mass media markets. Acknowledging
these new forms of data flow calls for serious rethinking of the
relevance of and need for existing legal doctrines and policy
objectives. In Part III, I strive to identify legal rules and policy
objectives, that facilitate the dynamics, addressed in Part I, and
thus lead to the beneficial outcomes mentioned in Part II. In other
words, I examine how decisions made by courts and legislators on
a variety of issues related to online social networking will affect
the flow of accurate and relevant information within these realms.
By tackling these three tasks, I strive to meet several
objectives. I hope to create a path for future scholarship on the role
of law and policy in the context of social networks to follow and I
aim to provide courts and regulators with general intuitions. These
intuitions will guide them toward decisions that promote the
beneficial dynamics transpiring within online social networks. I
briefly conclude in Part IV.
Largely, this Article’s objective is to call to the attention of
legal scholars, policy makers, and practitioners the issues,
challenges and promises these technological platforms and social
dynamics have in store. It should be noted, that a growing body of
scholarship on these issues already exists.
An important
contribution was made recently by Yochai Benkler, in his book
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The Wealth of Networks.11 In it, Benkler explains how technology,
economic forces, and social phenomena have led to novel
opportunities for the creation and distribution of information.12 He
demonstrates at great length how these opportunities can promote
many important social objectives, while emphasizing and focusing
on the ways they enhance personal autonomy,13 democracy, and
freedom. Benkler explains that these opportunities are a result of
the existing legal regimes and social institutions, and warns that
any change in their current balance and structure will realign this
equilibrium and thus limit (or even eliminate) the existing
beneficial outcomes.14 He further explains what rules and policies
should be adopted to promote these outcomes and objectives.
This Article recognizes Benkler’s great contribution to this line
of scholarship and takes a step forward by accepting many of his
basic assumptions and notions. In each of the next three sections,
it focuses on several specific issues which go beyond Benkler’s
initial analysis. In Part I, the Article focuses on a specific subset of
networks—online social networks.15 In Part II, it focuses on
specific benefits and outcomes of the social discourse within these
realms, rather than on broader questions of autonomy, free speech,
and democracy. Finally, in Part III, it focuses on concrete legal
steps which would facilitate the “wealth” of social networks, and
in that way ensure that the positive outcome addressed are indeed
achieved.
I. ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS—A PRIMER
In this Part, I provide the necessary background for
understanding the ongoing scholarly discourse on online social
networks, their inner workings, benefits, and challenges. I start by
defining online social networks in general, and those central to this

11

YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006), available at
http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf.
12
Id. at 2.
13
Id. at 9, 146.
14
Id. at 9.
15
Benkler indeed acknowledges and discusses these networks as well, but focuses in
most parts on the broader notions and effects of the Internet.
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discussion in particular. Thereafter I address the technological
tools and social behaviors that led to the flourishing of this realm.
I conclude by introducing the major challenges to the success of
these networks—an issue I return to in Part III where I examine the
legal response to these challenges.
A. Definitions
In the very general sense, social networks refer to platforms
that allow individuals to exchange messages and information, and
in some instances work together as a group or team toward various
objectives. Taking this notion online, however, is somewhat
confusing; it could refer to all social interactions occurring online,
since the Internet in general is a platform that facilitates such
behavior.16 For that reason, I apply a taxonomy to differentiate
various forms of social networks, while pointing out which forms
will be central to this Article’s analysis. Such a taxonomy could
be based on the technological tools applied17 or the number of the
network’s participants.18
While partially resorting to these
elements, I premise this Article’s analysis on distinctions among
social networks according to the strength of ties19 they create and
help maintain. In doing so, I refer to recent work by Lior
Strahilevitz (which in turn rests on decades of sociology
scholarship), to distinguish strong, intermediate, and weak forms
of ties, while choosing to focus on networks that facilitate the

16
As I explain below in the context of search engines, the web as a whole could be
viewed as a social network generating results as to the relevance of various webpages in
response to various queries. See infra Part I.B.
17
See generally Beth Simone Noveck, Democracy of Groups, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 27,
2005, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_11/noveck.
18
See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 373.
19
A great deal of scholarship in the fields of communications theory and sociology is
devoted to the analysis of various forms of networks while distinguishing them on the
basis of the strength of ties among participants. For instance, Granovetter examined
which form of social network is most helpful in helping individuals find their next job.
See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC.
THEORY 201, 205 (1983). He first found that networks of “weak ties” were of the
greatest help—yet later research proved that additional factors must be taken into
consideration (such as the form of job and education). Id. at 205–09.
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intermediate ones.20 I now explain this taxonomy and my
reasoning for addressing this particular segment. The Internet
provides for a great variety of social interactions. It allows users to
strengthen existing close social ties with family and friends, using
various means of communications applications such as e-mail,
instant messenger, blogs, Voice Over IP (VoIP) and the like.21 The
strengthening of these ties could also occur within the confines of a
network, such as mailing lists and other applications that facilitate
discussion. These dynamics also take place within other close
communities such as the workplace and neighborhoods. While
these dynamics and ties lead to intriguing outcomes, I choose to
exclude them from this discussion. Often they substitute or
enhance exchanges that would have occurred regardless of the
internet medium. They are subject to unique forms of motivation
to contribute as well as checking mechanisms for accreditation and
filtering. This is because participants interact offline or are all
subject to other sets of norms. For these reasons, both the
challenges they create and the responses to them differ from those
addressed throughout this Article.
At the other end of the social networking spectrum, the online
realm facilitates interactions between participants with very weak
social ties. I refer to open forums, which include comments left on
the fly within commercial or mass media websites. I also refer to
other platforms that generate an open discourse conducted in
complete anonymity. While these platforms indeed promote an
intriguing discourse, they generate a variety of problems,
especially with regard to a limited ability to weed out manipulative
content22 and in my view they are of little utility. I chose to
exclude them as well from this Article’s discussion.

20

Lior J. Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 366 (2003) [hereinafter Strahilevitz, Social Norms].
21
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 356–57; see also JEFFREY BOASE, ET AL., PEW INTERNET
AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE STRENGTH OF INTERNET TIES 10–14 (Jan. 25, 2006),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Internet_ties.pdf.
22
For an analysis of this issue, see Shmuel Becher & Tal Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine
2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2008) (manuscript at 32–33), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984765.
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As mentioned, the Article focuses on the third form of social
interactions online: that among users with intermediate ties.23
These forms of interaction feature a group of users, some of them
repeat players, who have already constructed a reputation and
identity within the online realm, given their ongoing contribution.24
The identity of the users is constructed with the help of
applications, ensuring that users have a consistent login name
when entering the network. The enhancement of reputation is
achieved through a variety of tools that aggregate information25 on
the users’ previous experiences, actions and interactions. These
tools also allow presentation of such information in a way that is
accessible and understandable to other network participants.26
Within these realms, some of the users have already learned to
identify others (especially the repeat players), formed relationships
with them and might even identify their specific online “voice.”27
These dynamics, which are facilitated by specific technological
tools, entail intriguing legal questions and policy implications,
which I address below.
B. Overview of Online Social Networks—Technological,
Social & Historical
The Internet enables users to connect with many others at a
nominal cost (in most cases, zero marginal cost) and with almost

23

Strahilevitz, Social Norms, supra note 20, at 366.
For a description of this dynamic, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 22, at 34.
25
See, e.g., Digg, http://www.digg.com. “Digg is a community-based popularity
website with an emphasis on technology and science articles.” Digg, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digg (last visited Nov. 29, 2007); see also BENKLER, supra
note 11, at 75–76 (discussing various methods that successful websites use to aggregate
data, thereby ensuring some degree of reliability for users); see generally Folksonomy,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folksonomy (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
(Folksonomy refers to bottom-up processes that are used for sorting and ranking).
26
The distinction between intermediate and weak-ties networks is far from clear.
Many of the platforms and websites which generate the latter strive to transform into the
former by adding various mechanisms to enhance reputation and create a consistent
identity, with varying success.
27
However, these online relationships need not entail the “piercing of the veil” between
the user’s online persona and his or her offline existence. On the contrary, interactions
are in many instances premised on the online user traits alone, while the offline persona
remains cloaked in pseudonymity.
24
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no geographical constraints.28 Given these traits and abilities, it is
no surprise that users early on made use of the Internet’s
infrastructure to construct and maintain various forms of social
networks, such as the early Multi-User Domains (“MUDs”), chat
rooms and forums.29 Even at this early juncture, these social
dynamics led to a variety of disputes and problems, which in turn
sparked academic interest.30 However, limited bandwidth, which
could only support an all-text environment, stopped these media
from gaining a broad following, as its inferior interface caused it to
lag behind “warmer” media such as TV. In addition, the inability
to search the contents of these realms effectively (successful search
technologies were developed only later) also31 minimized the
impact of these early networks.
Online social networks continued to develop in a variety of
realms. They prospered in several commercial settings, where
business entrepreneurs were quick to acknowledge that the
dynamics in these realms could be extremely beneficial to their
cause. Such was the case with the amazing success of eBay.com
and Amazon.com, and their reliance on rich online social networks.
eBay positioned itself as a virtual marketplace, where almost
anything could be bought and sold. It understood early on that
28

At this point and to a certain extent throughout this paper, I assume overall equality
in the ability to access and make use of the Internet and the applications it offers. Clearly
this assumption is false, as even today a large part of the world’s population are excluded
from the discourse addressed within this paper. However, this paper does not tackle the
“digital divide” issue for various reasons. Given the fact this paper is focused on the
discourse in developed countries, I am of the opinion that this issue is a transitional one.
See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 237. Not only are the costs of accessing the Internet
shrinking but many of the applications addressed throughout this analysis are accessible
through forms of hardware which are cheaper and more accessible than personal
computers, such as cell phones, personal digital assistants (“PDAs”), game consoles, and
in the near future TV sets as well.
29
See MUD, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MUD (last visited Nov. 29,
2007); Chat Room, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chat_Room (last visited Nov.
29, 2007); see also Joshua Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance
of Online Communities 8–9 (Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-20, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002997.
30
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 10–11, 98–99 (2006), available at
http://pdf.codev2.cc/Lessig-Codev2.pdf (discussing border disputes and sexual assault in
virtual space).
31
I return below to a discussion of search engines and search technologies, and their
great importance to the dynamics addressed here.
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merely constructing a platform for commercial transactions would
be insufficient—it must also generate trust between buyers and
sellers, and formulate a system that would effectively signal the
trustworthiness of existing participants to newcomers. eBay
famously delegates this task to its users, who provide various
forms of feedback on their transactions that is made available to
other parties.32 Yet to motivate users to provide this essential
feedback, eBay goes to great lengths to generate a “community
feeling” among participants.33 Thus, eBay’s account holders are
more than merely consumers in the world’s biggest market—they
are part of a vast social network that produces a valuable asset: the
reputation rankings for eBay’s long list of vendors.
Amazon.com also benefited from embedding social networks
in its business model, albeit by a different approach. Amazon did
not need any help in vouching for its sellers (at least not
originally34), as Amazon itself took the role of vending products
and content. Moreover, Amazon confronted its users with a vast
variety of products, far exceeding any local bookstore.35 Thus, it
needed new mechanisms to guide users through its extensive
collection. To do so, it again chose to rely on the wisdom of the
masses and on information streaming from other users and
consumers. For instance, consumers could explicitly provide
reviews of books they had read and create a list of favorite
products.36 Beyond that, profiling the users’ preferences for
various forms of books and products allowed Amazon (through the
use of sophisticated data mining techniques) to provide users with
recommendations for other products based on their prior behavior,

32

See Feedback Forum, eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
33
See, e.g., Keith Regan, Plugging In: Can E-Commerce Leverage Social Networks?,
E-COMMERCE TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, available at http://www.technewsworld.com/
story/dqTa3ScZHwOR6I/Plugging-In-Can-E-Commerce-Leverage-SocialNetworks.xhtml.
34
Today, Amazon offers access to many other vendors. See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE
LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 92 (2006).
35
For that matter, it far exceeds the largest bookstores in the world. See ANDERSON,
supra note 34, at 23.
36
See Your Lists, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/gp/lists/homepage.html/
ref=topnav_lists_gw (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
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as well as that of their peers.37 To a certain extent, all
Amazon.com users are part of a broad social network, which
shares information about consumer behavior and preferences, and
in the process, creates an astounding prediction model of future
selections by online purchasers.38
Beyond these examples, social networking has seen a massive
surge in popularity during the last few years. The main reason for
such success is probably technological.39 The penetration of
broadband has allowed users to experience the Internet in a much
“richer” way—with real-time sound, animation and, at last, video.
The quicker and better online connections facilitated downstreaming of content, as well as a capability for easy uploading and
sharing of various forms of “home made”40 content with many
others. These and other developments41 have sent consumers
flocking sites such as MySpace, Facebook, Flickr, and many
others, which provide access to vast amounts of “uploaded”
content. In these networks, users share information on content, as
well as disseminate the content itself. The development and use of
software tools (at times called “Social Software”)42 that facilitate
the creation of communities, allowing participants to create online
reputations, has also generated other forms of online social
networking. The Wiki, for instance, through the creation of a
37

See Recommended for you, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/gp/yourstore
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
38
See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 75–76. Benkler goes on to demonstrate that, to a
certain extent, Google, too, relies on social networks and connections—for instance, how
the links that webpage owners apply to their own pages collectively signal their interest
in—or “vote” for—web pages throughout the net.
39
See Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the
Next Generation of Software, O’REILLY MEDIA, Sept. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web20.html?page=1 (discussing the development and traits of “Web 2.0”).
40
Be
it
software
(e.g.,
http://www.opensource.org),
audio
(e.g.,
http://www.soundforge.com), graphics (e.g., http://www.picasa.com), video (e.g.,
http://www.adobe.com/products/premiere), or a mix of them all.
41
Such as tools that allow the creation of content on just a home computer, or a
technology that enables searches within and throughout social networks. See Michael J.
Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Law, MICH. ST. L. REV. 153, 158 (2006); Noveck,
supra note 17, at 106.
42
See Clay Shirky, Social Software and the Politics of Groups, Mar. 9, 2003,
http://www.shirky.com/writings/group_politics.html; BENKLER, supra note 11, at 373.
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supporting social network, assists individuals to work together for
a common goal, and has led to the development of Wikipedia, and
other impressive projects.43
The development of Massive
Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs),44 also known as “Virtual
Worlds,” has allowed online communities to flourish in an
immersive environment.45
When discussing the evolution of online social networks, I
must also emphasize the impact of general search engines.46
Search engines amplify the discourse in these realms by allowing
any user (and not only active or passive participants in the relevant
networks) to access the content developed in the network's
confines.47 Not all networks view this outcome favorably. Some
have moved to block search engines from accessing and indexing
social networks. Yet in general it is the search engine that has
transformed the social dynamics of the described social networks
from a remote obscurity to a powerful force with far-reaching
implications.
C. Limits and Challenges
After the enthusiastic overview provided above, it is time for
some cooling words. Online social networks show much promise,
yet the dynamics that creates an efficient flow of relevant, helpful,
and correct information to many of their users faces several

43

See DON TAPSCOTT AND ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS 254–57 (2006).
Such as Second Life (http://www.secondlife.com), The Sims (http://thesims.ea.com),
and World of Warcraft (http://www.worldofwarcraft.com). See TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS,
supra note 43, at 242; see generally BALKIN & NOVECK, supra note 10.
45
In some instances, a rich and successful online network emerged premised on simple
and “text only” interfaces—such as the “open source” community and project. See
generally ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR (2d ed. 2001), available
at http://safari.oreilly.com/0596001088. However, as this example has many specific
attributes, I believe its explanatory value is limited.
46
Search engines are themselves fueled by interesting social networks and dynamics.
See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 75–76.
47
While it is true that many of the social networks have their own powerful search
tools—such as Wikipedia and YouTube—the general search engines (such as Google)
also take users to networks that do not apply such search technologies. It also takes users
who are not acquainted with the world of online social networks to the information that
lies within these realms. These engines then aggregate all the information gathered from
the various social networks into one “results” page, while also ranking and prioritizing it.
44
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obstacles. I will briefly summarize them, while referring to the
need for sufficient platforms, motivation, and accreditation. I
conclude this part by addressing the trends and implications of
actual participation in these social networks.
Platforms are the basic requirement for the existence of social
networks. For social networks with intermediate ties to exist,
software and memory space must be made available for user
participation. Ample commercial interests48 apparently support a
variety of firms providing these services. Yet the mere existence
of platforms is not enough—they must be neutral, and allow the
discourse to proceed without a specific entity promoting its own
agenda or interest. I will address this limitation briefly below,
noting that while this issue is one of great concern in other
contexts,49 it does not seem problematic in the context of social
networks.
The question of Motivation is a challenge academics face when
trying to understand the inner workings of online social networks,
and that entrepreneurs consider when contemplating a business
venture reliant on these dynamics. In these networks, we are
currently witnessing a great deal of effort exerted by users—at
times supplanting the work of many paid experts.50 This conduct
is generally understood to be motivated by a flurry of internal

48
Such as subscription fees, advertising or reaping the fruits of the deliberative process
occurring within the network.
49
Such as the Network Neutrality debate, which addresses the ability of the entities
controlling the telecom infrastructure to control the content transferred through it. See
Robert Atkinson & Phil Weiser, A Third Way on Network Neutrality, THE NEW
ATLANTIS, Summer 2006, at 47, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/13/
TNA13-AtkinsonWeiser.pdf; Letter from Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Stanford Law
School and Tim Wu, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Aug. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.freepress.net/docs/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf; Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal
Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium: The Digital
Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age (Feb. 8, 2004),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf.
50
Such is the case of the Mozilla organization and the Firefox Browser project.
Compare Firefox, http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/firefox (developed by the Mozilla open
source community), with Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, http://www.microsoft.com/
windows/products/winfamily/ie/default.mspx (requiring the employment of many
thousands of employees to develop).
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motivations51 such as altruism, communality, spite, and
self-fulfillment. However, in some instances, external motivations
are at work as well—such as the creation of an offline reputation as
an expert, or actual emolument by the relevant platform. In every
instance of reliance on social networks and their internal dynamics,
one must ask whether the existing balance between the users’
motivations and their counter-acting forces (such as the users’
feeling that they are being taken advantage of by other free riders
or possible legal liability issues) will be maintained. Clearly, with
this balance disrupted, the social network, as an active
environment producing information flow and content, will cease to
exist.
Accreditation refers to the requirement that the information
flowing through these realms be relevant, accurate, and impartial.
Here I address several concerns.52 One is that the content
submitted by a participant in the social network is irrelevant or
wrong due to his or her incompetence or error. This concern,
however, is sufficiently dealt with by various technological tools53
and social dynamics. Therefore, I refrain from addressing it in this
Article’s subsequent sections.
Another serious concern is that the information is intentionally
tampered-with for various commercial interests. In many instances
participants and interest groups strive to present information to
other consumers in a certain way, and to do so attempt to "game"
and manipulate the various filtering, accreditation, and reputation
mechanisms the online social network puts in place. They would
do so, for instance, to promote a product, slander a rival, or gain
prominence in the public sphere. The arms race between the
“gamers” and those trying to block this practice is currently played
51
See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 102; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA 120, 139 (2006).
For a discussion of spite as a motivator see Lior J. Strahilevitz, ‘How’s My Driving?’ For
Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1713 (2006) [hereinafter
Strahilevitz, How’s My Driving?].
52
See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 22, at 30–34, 54–55.
53
See id. at 29–32; Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Reputation Mechanisms, in HANDBOOK ON
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ECONOMICS (T. Hendershott ed. 2006), available at
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/cdell/papers/elsevierchapter.pdf; Tal Z. Zarsky,
Assessing Alternative Compensation Models for Online Content Consumption, 84 DENV.
U. L. REV. 645, 709 n.242 (2007) [hereinafter Zarsky, Denver].
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out in a variety of online contexts,54 and it is unclear whether
technology alone would suffice to allay these serious concerns.
Finally, the many benefits that may be derived from fruitful
discourse in online social networks depend on the actual
participation of the very few. According to recent surveys only
12% of all Internet users participate (even in the most limited
fashion) in the discourse taking place within these social
networks.55 However, this statistic alone need not generate
concern, for two reasons: first, these same surveys indicate a
constant rise in such participation.56 Second, as mentioned above,
search engines substantially alter these numbers and allow curious,
browsing users to enter the ongoing discourse and gather
information related to their specific query. In other words, search
engines further distribute the knowledge generated within the
realms of the online social networks.
However, scrutiny of the inner-workings of social networks
makes it quite clear that of the overall number of participating
users, the percentage of contributing users (as opposed to those
passively consuming information, or even seeking advice) is
extremely low.57 Commentators addressing this issue have
recently suggested58 a triangular distributional structure of the
54

See Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet
Transactions: Empirical Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, unpublished working paper, 2001), available at http://www.si.umich.edu/
~presnick/papers/ebayNBER/RZNBERBodegaBay.pdf (discussing how eBay users’
reputation scores are subject to manipulation); Zarsky, Denver, supra note 53, at 686
(addressing the practice of search-engine optimization).
55
Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 3 (Pew Institute findings regarding usage of
online rating systems (32%), participation in online discussions (22%) and social
networking (16%)).
56
In September 2005, only 11% of all Internet users used social networks. See Pew
Institute’s analysis of usage over time, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
trends/UsageOverTime.xls.
57
Only 0.2% of visits to YouTube involve users uploading a video, 0.16% of Flickr
visits are people posting photos, and 4.56% of visits to Wikipedia result in
content-editing. See Bill Tancer, Who’s Really Participating In Web 2.0, TIME, Apr. 25,
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1614751,00.html.
58
See Jacob Nielsen, Participation Inequality: Encouraging More Users to Contribute,
Oct. 9, 2006, available at http://www.useit.com/alertbox/participation_inequality.html;
Bradley Horowitz, Creators, Synthesizers, and Consumers, Feb. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.elatable.com/blog/2006/02/17/creators-synthesizers-and-consumers.
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social networks’ workload, where 90% of all users interact merely
passively or seek consumer information, 10% contribute
occasionally and incidentally (by making slight corrections, or
tagging, grading, and commenting on existing content), and a mere
1% shoulder most of the administrative and creative burdens of the
networks’ discourse.
These findings raise several concerns. First, they oblige us to
rethink the notion of social network dynamics transpiring online as
an open and democratic process. Since a very limited number of
users stand at the core of information production and flow, this
small group has a powerful impact on the information the great
majority of passive users view and consume. I will save discussion
of this important issue for future analyses.59 Second, they require
us carefully to consider the “manipulation and accreditation” and
“motivation” concerns mentioned above, and also below. When so
few sources exercise such profound influence on the overall
discourse, the notion of an ability to manipulate it for commercial
and other interests is not far-fetched.60 Conventional economic
analysis tends to view instances in which the actions of the very
few are benefited by many as those that create “free-riding”
issues—and eventually cause the contributing few to cease given
their frustration and their limited compensation. Scholars61
addressing the motivations of users in social networks go to great
lengths to explain why this result need not transpire in the setting
here discussed. Yet the empirical findings mentioned here clearly
indicate that they have an uphill battle, and that the users'
motivation to contribute within these realms is an issue constantly
in the need of concern and attention. I return to these two issues
throughout my analysis.
Before concluding this issue, two reassuring comments are due.
First, even with these findings, online social networks are a great
success.62 Second, despite the low rate of actual participation,
59
See BENKLER, supra note 11, at 259 (arguing that this is not a serious concern, and
that overall, online control and influence is diffused, and in any event, cannot be bought).
60
See, e.g., infra note 133.
61
See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369, 438 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin].
62
See TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 10–20.
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social networks appeal to a vast audience and their access costs are
very small. Therefore, the nominal number of engaged participants
is impressive overall and might be sufficient to meet the various
objectives addressed throughout the paper. This however, might
not be always the case when the overall “target” audience of the
social network is limited. This would occur when participation in
the online discourse requires a great deal of expertise, or a specific
language or skill set.
II. ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS AND NETWORKING—AND
THEIR (SOMEWHAT SURPRISING) LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
A. General—and the IP example
The online social networks described above bring together
individuals from distant locations and enable them to exchange
information, which is filtered, accredited and valuable to their
recipient. Furthermore, as Don Tapscott recently demonstrates in
“Wikinomics,”63 these dynamics produce enormous social benefits
as the collective wisdom of distant parties comes together to create
value. According to Benkler, the dynamics in these realms
constitutes a third model of production, which competes with the
“market” and the “firm,” and at times surpasses them in its
sustainability and effectiveness.64
These new and exciting opportunities for generating value and
utility necessarily exert a profound effect on law and policy. In
various instances, laws and regulation strive to promote
information flows and content production. In others, regulators
respond to the lack or paucity of such flows and content production
by regulating specific markets and market players (as lack of
information flow results in market failures and suboptimal market
outcomes). With these new flows and forms of content creation in
place, the rationale for such regulation (in specific instances) is
substantially undermined.
I demonstrate this argument by
referring to the impact of online social networks on intellectual
63
64

TAPSCOTT, supra note 43, at 10–20.
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 122.
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property (“IP”) law and policy – an argument recently made by
several leading scholars. Then, I extend this argument to other,
more provocative contexts.
IP law is premised on the notion that without providing authors
with ownership and control over their works, they will fail to
further produce materials that are extremely important for human
progress.65 In the context of copyright, movie producers, for
instance, will not shrink from the high upfront investment needed
to produce a motion picture, as they know they can reap the fruits
of their work and block unauthorized uses.66 Copyright similarly
protects the business models for today’s media firms, and allows
them to attend to the distribution of books, music, and films
through their sophisticated distribution channels.67 In doing so,
these media firms fulfill the essential role of filtering the vast
amounts of content available, while only providing their audience
with a few selected works.68
Providing “authors” (in the broadest context) with IP rights
comes at a high social cost. Owner's property rights over their
creation and work allows them to exclude others from using it at
their discretion.69 These “others” might be authors who wish to
rely on earlier works to develop new ones and promote overall
progress. In the context of patents, they might be parties interested
in transforming the somewhat abstract patent application into an

65

This stems from the fact that Intellectual Property is by nature a “public good.” For
more on this issue, see WILLIAM FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP 199–201 (Stanford
University Press 2004). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
66
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating the exclusive rights afforded by federal
copyright).
67
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (including among the subject matter protected by copyright:
literary works, music works, and motion pictures).
68
FISHER, supra note 65, at 78.
69
Clearly, in the context of IP, right holders are not free to exclude at their discretion in
all instances. For example, users are shielded from infringement claims should they
prove they engaged in “fair use” as defined by the courts. 17 U.S.C. § 107. However,
given the shrinking nature of this defense, many argue that copyright to the extent it is
enforced today, substantially impedes prospective creators. See BENKLER, supra note 11,
at 440–41. On the link between fair use and important democratic objectives, see Balkin,
supra note 10, at 53.
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actual product that will have beneficial uses.70 Yet IP law removes
works and inventions from the public domain—a price paid for the
sake of motivating future progress and invention.
Enter online social networks. In these realms, various
important social objectives are achieved, free of the high cost of
removing works and other forms of valuable knowledge from the
public domain. Extensive encyclopedias are erected without the
need to provide contributors with the prospect of future monetary
compensation for their work.71 Vast amounts of user-generated
content are circulated, ranked, and distributed among interested
consumers, who do not charge others for consuming their content,
and without the ability to block unwanted usage.72 Software tools
of extreme complexity are written by volunteers.73 These
examples and many others show that property rights (at least those
allotted by today’s IP legal systems) might not be the only way to
promote creation, progress, and efficient distribution of ideas. On
the contrary, the existence of such property rights can potentially
stall the dynamics within social networks. IP owners can move to
block the use of their works within these networks, thus limiting
the benefits previously mentioned. Therefore, the dynamics within
online social networks strengthens voices calling for the limitation
of IP protection in the digital age.74
The success of online social networks, as opposed to the
internet in general, will play a crucial role in making this
argument. The Internet in general, which facilitates networks of
both weak and strong ties, provides the tools and the infrastructure
for consuming content and distributing it efficiently. However,
without the social networks, the Internet might merely redistribute
70

Benkler addressed in length the detriments of the patent system in this context.
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 344.
71
Wikipedia, as well as other peer production projects, provides some rights to
authors—notably the right to block commercial uses without the consent of Wikipedia.
See
Copyright,
Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Copyrights (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
72
See, e.g., Youtube, http://www.youtube.com (allowing site visitors to rate videos,
embed on their own blogs, and share with friends) (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
73
See, e.g., The Apache Software Foundation, http://apache.org (last visited Feb. 11,
2008).
74
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 49.
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existing works and become another medium dominated by the
existing media giants.75 The social networks’ ability to generate
new content, and effectively distribute user-generated content in a
broad, yet reliable way, is crucial for making the argument for
limiting IP rights convincing.
B. Online Social Networks and the Easing of
Governmental Intervention
1. Consumer Protection
Scholars have drawn on the dynamics in online social networks
to argue for the limitation of IP protection.76 This notion fits well
within the overall liberal objective of promoting free speech, and a
rich ongoing discourse among individuals. However, I now show
that arguments that are similarly premised on the online social
networking dynamics should lead to a change of a very different
flavor—one that is libertarian in nature and calls for the limitation
of governmental intervention, while allowing markets alone to
yield optimal outcomes. I will demonstrate these somewhat
surprising yet inevitable claims by briefly addressing two contexts:
consumer protection (while also addressing contracts of adhesion),
and media policy.
In a capitalistic regime the state chooses to refrain from
interfering in the nature of transactions betweens vendors and
consumers, if the market is not subject to various “market
failures.”77 Nevertheless, in some instances the state chooses to
intervene. One dominant rationale78 for such intervention is that
the consumers’ decision to pursue the transaction is premised on
insufficient and partial information. The high cost of collecting
75

For more on this argument, see Zarsky, Denver, supra note 53, at 707.
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 49.
77
Oren Bar-Gill & Richard A. Epstein, Consumer Contracts: Behavioral Economics
vs. Neoclassical Economics, 92 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (Epstein section, at 1),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982527; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner,
One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Market, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 829 n.4–
5 (2006).
78
There are other rationales for intervening, such as public safety, undue influence over
the consumer at the time of the transaction, or the fact that consumers are in a vulnerable
mental state at that specific time. We do not deal with these matters in this Article.
76
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and comprehending transaction-related information allows vendors
to benefit from information asymmetries, and draft terms biased
toward the vendors.79 The information asymmetries between
vendors and consumers lead to unequal bargaining power, and
therefore unfair and inefficient outcomes.
Intervention in this context takes several forms. One milder
form is requiring vendors to provide consumers with more and
specific information80 prior to the transaction. Another, more
aggressive route, is setting mandatory terms that will govern the
transaction ex ante, or intervene ex post when transactional terms
appear unfair.81
A closely related issue is the courts’ intervention and
enforcement of consumer standard form contracts.82 Courts,
sometimes refrain from enforcing these contracts, finding them
unconscionable (or applying other doctrines).83 In some of these
cases, courts change the contractual provisions ex post to reflect
(what the court believes to be) a fair outcome. The theory
explaining such intervention (beyond mere paternalism on the part
of the courts) states that courts intervene given the fact that the
consumer did not know of, or could not comprehend the
implications of the contractual provisions at the time of contract
formation.84
Although some schools of policy and legal thought find these
forms of intervention commendable, many others frown on them
79

Bar-Gill & Epstein, supra note 77, at Epstein 1–2.
See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–15 (2000). For a recent debate
on these forms of regulation, see Bar-Gill & Epstein, supra note 77, at Bar-Gill 35,
Epstein 3.
81
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1187–88 (2003). These forms of intervention are far more
popular in the European Union (“E.U.”). See generally Francesco Parisi, The
Harmonization of Legal Warranties in European Law: An Economic Analysis, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 403 (2004).
82
For more on this issue, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 22, at 5 n.11, 8 n.23;
Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 77, at 829 n.7.
83
Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 77, at 829 n.7. For recent examples in the Internet
context, see Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002); but see
Feldman v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 966011 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007). See also Bebchuck
& Posner, supra note 77, at 829 n. 8–9 for additional references.
84
See supra note 83; see generally supra Part I.
80
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and argue they should be strictly limited to the most necessary
instances.85 They point out that regulators and legislators are in
many instances captured, or fail to grasp and understand the
market forces at play when they set mandatory terms.86 They
argue that the (apparently non-intervening) disclosure requirements
might lead to negative outcomes.87 They further assert that courts
are in no position to regulate the contractual setting between the
parties, given the complexity of this task; to do so, courts are
required to establish ex post, and without actual knowledge of the
parties’ state of mind and expertise, what would have been a fair
and efficient transaction at the time of contract formation.88
Overall, these powerful arguments state that, when possible,
markets are the preferable means to govern consumer transactions,
unless various market failures are manifest.
Again, enter online social networks. As mentioned, one major
benefit of these platforms is that they facilitate enhanced flows of
accredited and relevant information. In this specific context
(information related to consumer transactions) a variety of social
networks offer a wealth of information,89 as many such realms are
devoted to consumer transactions. Within these networks data are
provided by experienced consumers, advisors and public-interest
groups, and even by the vendors themselves (regarding their and
their competitors’ product).90 Such information flows among the

85

Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 77, at 834.
See Robert A. Hillman, On-line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure
of E-standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 845 (2006); Clayton P. Gillette,
Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 982 (2005).
87
See Hillman, supra note 86, at 849.
88
Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge
that is Yet to be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 50–51),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016010.
89
See, e.g., http://www.epinions.com; http://www.yelp.com;
http://www.consumerreview.com (all popular consumer information websites).
90
Clearly this issue raises questions as to whether users are sufficiently motivated to
provide such information. In these instances, a variety of motivations (such as spite,
altruism and communality) contribute to an overall affirmative response. See Becher &
Zarsky, supra note 22, at 31. In addition, this form of data flow is especially susceptible
to manipulative practices given the commercial importance of this information. On the
chances of allaying this concern, see id. at 29; Strahilevitz, How’s My Driving?, supra
note 51, at 1733–35.
86
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networks’ participants, and in many cases can also be accessed by
outsiders using general search engines.
In view of the above, if online social networks prove a
sustainable91 phenomenon and provide a rich and ongoing
information flow, markets and other social dynamics could in
many additional instances substitute consumer protection
measures. They could close the information gap between vendors
and consumers, and rebalance information asymmetries.
Intervention by courts and regulators in the nature of the
transaction (and in the standard form contracts that govern them)
would for the most part be unnecessary. This would be true in
cases which present sufficient evidence of such an information
flow, and also indications that indeed a sizeable92 group of
consumers seeks out consumer-related information from these
networks prior to concluding their transaction. Recent survey data
show that consumers in e-commerce consumer markets93 tend to
consult search engines, forums, and social networks prior to
concluding their transaction. Therefore, regulators and courts
should reconsider intervening in these transactions (in competitive
settings).94 Furthermore, in the future this notion of “non
91
Benkler indeed forcefully argues that such online dynamics are not a fad. BENKLER,
supra note 11, at 106.
92
As scholars in the field of law and economics point out in several contexts, not all
consumers must be exposed to this information flow and take the data it includes into
consideration. Just a marginal group of knowledgeable consumers would be sufficient to
deter vendors from applying imbalanced transactional terms in a competitive setting. See
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interest, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983); Becher &
Zarsky, supra note 22, at 8.
93
For a recent survey containing data regarding Internet activities see Pew Internet &
American Life Project, Internet Activities, http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/
Internet_Activities_8.28.07.htm (last visited Feb. 11. 2008). According to the survey,
78% of all Internet users research a product or service before buying it. Id.
94
This assertion clearly conflicts with the E.U. perspective on such transactions which
(quite to the contrary) calls for enhanced intervention in this setting. See Directive on
Electronic Commerce, Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:
178:0001:0016:EN:PDF. The directive sets out several rules which govern the ecommerce transaction and could be viewed as intervening such as the requirement that
the supplier provide the purchaser with written confirmation of the contract before or at
the time of delivery (Article 5), the right of withdrawal (or a “cooling off period”)
(Article 6), and the obligation of suppliers to carry out the contract within 30 days of
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intervention” in view of the online social networking dynamics
might spread to other, offline markets that present the specific
traits I address above.
At this point the cautious reader will question whether the
argument made here must rely on online social networks, or
whether the Internet in general might suffice. Here I assert that the
unique traits of data flows among individuals with ties of
intermediate-strength are those which make this argument
convincing. Only such flows can reach a sizeable part of the
market, which would lead to the required impact. Moreover, only
these forms of flow, which are motivated and accredited, will
ensure that a sufficient level of trustable information is made
available to a sufficiently large group of consumers.95
2. Regulating the Structure of Media Markets
Mass media markets are subject to several layers and forms of
regulation and governmental scrutiny. Beyond steps concerning
actual content,96 regulators set in place rules which govern the
structure of the markets for TV broadcast, radio, and cable, as well
as vertical integration in the overall market.97 Such rules limit the
market share and reach of various market players in specific
markets and overall.
The rules set in place to govern competition in media markets
go beyond the standards applied in other markets, where
competition is promoted and assured on the basis of antitrust law.98
In addition to competition (which is defined differently in this
specific context), media regulation sets out to meet unique
placing the order, unless agreed otherwise (Article 7). This is in addition to extensive
disclosure requirements which the vendor must make prior to the transaction (Article 4).
95
For more on this issue, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 22, at 39 n.178.
96
For example, obscene content or the regulation of equal access to the media by
politicians. See generally BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 224,
(Carolina Press 2006) (2001) [hereinafter BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOM. L. & POLICY]. I
will not address these issues here.
97
For explanations and descriptions of these ever-changing rules, see id. at 401;
Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law and Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards
Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 372–80 (2006).
98
It is extremely challenging to premise existing media concentration rules on the basis
of antitrust rationale alone. See Shelanski, supra note 97, at 396.
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objectives—to ensure diversity and maintain localism.99 The
reasoning behind these stricter standards and additional elements is
premised on several distinct notions: promoting free speech,
assuring a rich public discourse, with a variety of voices,
empowering all parts of society, and promoting democracy.100
Considering these important (yet broad and abstract)
objectives, existing media concentration rules are justified as an
essential measure to prevent instances in which very few entities
control the crucial bottlenecks to the public’s attention.101
Broadcast TV, radio, cable TV, and to a certain extent the printed
press are all regarded as the primary means through which
individuals gather news and information, which they later apply to
make various decisions.102 Allowing a limited number of firms to
control these crucial bottlenecks will afford them a great deal of
influence over the ongoing discourse and eventually the public’s
behavior (thus compromising the broader objectives mentioned).
Another justification, also premised on the broad and abstract
notions mentioned states that regulating media market structure
and maintaining a specific number of independent media players,
is essential to make sure that the public is exposed to a rich and
diverse variety of content.103 The public might be deprived of such
diversity should the media market remain dominated by few
players, who might choose to focus on a limited number of voices
and content for business or ideological reasons. As key media
scholars point out, even an increase in the number of outlets is no

99

Id. at 372; BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOM. L. & POLICY, at 64. Here the authors
correctly point out that these notions at times conflict.
100
See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY–WHY OWNERSHIP
MATTERS 5 (2007).
101
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 202 (“The degree of concentration in media markets
supports the proposition that owners of media can either exercise power over the
programming they provide . . . or sell their power . . . .”).
102
Benkler articulates this issue by stating that control over these entities leads to the
potential impediment over the individual’s autonomy. Id. at 147; see also BAKER, supra
note 100, at 121.
103
Shelanski, supra note 97, at 384 (referring to attempts to meet this objective as the
“democracy model” of public interest).
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guarantee of diversity, given the ills of an advertising-sponsored
media market.104
As the rationales for these regulatory steps are premised on
important, yet abstract and fluid notions (how many voices assure
a democratic discourse—5? 50? 500?),105 they are constantly
contested by the regulated parties (which tend to be powerful and
influential media firms) and are therefore closely scrutinized by the
courts.106 Over the last few years, courts have not shied away from
invalidating broad regulatory structures, finding that they are not
premised on proper empirical findings and analytical arguments.107
While examining these issues, courts (and commentators on these
matters as well) accept the notion that these rules cannot be
overbroad and restrictive for no apparent reason. Not only would
such excessive rules limit the autonomy and commercial freedom
of the regulated parties, they might also lead to inefficient
outcomes for the overall media market which would be deprived of
the potential benefits of horizontal and vertical integration.
Moreover, some scholars argue108 that these restrictions constitute
limitations upon the media firms’ free speech rights (to engage in
speech of their own through their medium of choice). For these
reasons, media concentration policy must be carved out with even
greater caution and must be backed by sufficient empirical findings
and an analytical framework.
The emergence of the Internet as a popular medium has yet to
have a substantial effect on this regulatory issue. On the face of it,
the Internet adds a flurry of voices at the fingertips of all users.
Media moguls have already announced they see no sense in
regulating the issues under review here when users can access

104

BENKLER, supra note 11, at 206. Note that the counter-argument exists as well: only
a limited number of voices can guarantee diversity in ideas. For a discussion of this
classical argument and its rebuttal see id. at 206–08.
105
Benkler struggles with this notion. Id. at 206.
106
For recent cases, see Fox Television v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Prometheus Radio Project
v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
107
For a discussion of these cases see Shelanski, supra note 97, at 391, 419.
108
Shelanski, supra note 97, at 411, 417.
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limitless sources online.109 The powerful media players can also
easily argue that users are in no way subject to the media
companies’ content selection (so one cannot argue they control a
crucial bottleneck).110 However, the policy landscape has yet
substantially to change in light of these novel factors.111
The neglect to account for the way in which the Internet
undermines many of the rationales for existing media
concentration policy could be explained in several ways. At first,
during the first days of the web regulators were probably correct to
assume that the powerful draw of the “warm” television medium112
was still no match for the Internet’s slow and somewhat “cold”
interface. It was also initially unclear whether the Internet was a
109

See Murdoch interview with Alan Jones, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 7, 2004,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/07/1081222525705.html (“There is so much
media now with the Internet and people . . . and so easy and so cheap to start a newspaper
or start a magazine, there’s just millions of voices, and people want to be heard. And we
don’t really have to worry . . . you know, the old ideas of it being too concentrated . . . I
think that’s fading away.”). This notion was echoed by (the then) FCC Commissioner
Powell, who moved to change media ownership rules, claiming that the current rules fail
to take into account the growing influence of Internet and paid television programming,
and have been broadly questioned by the courts. See Frank Ahrens, FCC Set to Vote on
Easing Media Ownership Rules, WASHINGTON POST, at A06, June 2, 2003, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A10072003Jun1.
110
But see BENKLER, supra note 11, at 399–402 (discussing concerns that entities
controlling the Internet’s broadband infrastructure will leverage such control toward
control over the content flowing “over it”). These concerns led to the heated “network
neutrality” debate mentioned above. Id. To date, these concerns have yet to become
manifest.
111
The FCC has actually taken the existence and scope of Internet websites addressing
news-related matters into account when constructing the Diversity Index (“DI”) which
was intended to provide indications as to overall media market diversity (and thus
provide indications as to whether cross ownership mergers are to be permitted).
However, in the Prometheus case mentioned above, the court invalidated the rules
addressing the role of the Internet in the DI in view of insufficient empirical evidence and
backing (finding that it imparted too much weight to single websites in comparison to
other media outlets) and remanded them to the FCC for further review of this issue.
Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 406. On this issue, see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J.
WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 382 (MIT Press 2005).
112
This terminology is based on Marshall McLuhan’s “The Medium Is the Message”
phrase, first introduced in MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE
EXTENSIONS OF MAN (MIT Press 1994) (1964). For more on this phrase, see The medium
is the message, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_medium_is_the_message
(last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
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medium that generated new content or merely a pipe through
which content developed elsewhere was made available.113
Whether the Internet would be dominated by the same large media
groups that control the offline world was similarly unclear.114 It
was indeed feasible to assert that the Internet need not provide real
diversity as the voices (and sources of content) in it would be the
same as those offline, and the distribution of content throughout
the net would be controlled by the same offline players as well.
Therefore, there would be no reason to ease media concentration
regulation.
However, at this juncture I again wish to signify online social
networks as an important factor that would require courts and
policy makers to rethink the soundness of existing media market
regulation policies. Online social networks—when grouped with
existing online tools such as search engines, and while taking into
account the constant spread of broadband infrastructure—provide
powerful responses to several concerns which media concentration
policy strives to address. In other words, with online social
networks in place, the promise of the Internet as a medium that
would heal many of the media markets’ ills is largely fulfilled.
These networks (as well as other tools of user participation, such as
blogs) encourage and facilitate the generation of a public discourse
outside the realm of broadcast media—a discourse that is to a
certain degree filtered and accredited as well.115 Most of these
networks are premised on neutral platforms, and in any event, the
multiplicity of these networks limits the ability of one party to
exercise bottleneck-like control.
These networks also present a sophisticated mechanism for
distributing existing content—both user and commercially
generated—among the group members.116 With this dynamic in
113

BAKER, supra note 100, at 100.
See id. at 112; Shelanski, supra note 97, at 412–13. For early concerns voiced in this
fashion, see Neil Netanel, Cyberspace Self Governance, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 440–41,
463–65. For more, see Zarsky, Denver, supra note 53, at 701–02.
115
Baker is unconvinced that the Internet can prove to be an important factor that would
affect media concentration policy. BAKER, supra note 100, at 104–05. In part, he states
problems with reliability in the online realm. However, the discourse transpiring within
social networks partially resolves this concern.
116
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 85, 426.
114
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place, broadcast media can no longer be accused of having a
bottleneck hold over the taste and preferences of content
consumers. Most importantly, the dynamics within these networks
promote not only the distribution but also the creation of content
within the network, and in that way supplement the content
provided by the media group “controlling” the broadcast realm. In
view of these arguments, I believe that the existence of the Internet
medium ultimately calls for serious reconsideration of
concentration policy (as it stands today) in other media.117
Clearly, this issue requires extensive additional research and
writing, which need to be coupled with both empirical and
economic studies. I leave these for a later time. At this juncture I
wish only to summarize by emphasizing two points: first, there is
an analytical link between media concentration policy and the
success of online social networks (and not merely the existence of
the Internet in general). These new tools for content distribution
and creation should be considered when courts and regulators
address media concentration policy. Second, the fact that online
social networks promote competition, diversity, and localism
throughout the media is yet another concrete example of their
importance. Yet these benefits (and their potential policy
implications) will transpire and persist only if these networks are
premised on independent and reliable platforms. In addition, they
must consist of sufficiently motivated participants, and must be
properly insulated from manipulation by interested parties. While
some of these objectives are secured by market and other forces,
others might require the intervention of the law, as I discuss below.
3. Additional Issues and Guidelines for Future Inquiries
Beyond these specific examples, online social networks will
have additional effects on existing legal regimes, which are
difficult to predict at this time. Generally, online social networks
allow individuals to organize, deliberate, act, and produce with
much greater efficiency. They are thereby able to overcome
coordination costs which might have been unbearable at other
times. It would be wise for regulators and courts to keep in mind
117

For an opposing view, see BAKER, supra note 100, at 100, 116.

ZARSKY_022508_FINAL

770

2/25/2008 7:20:18 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

the existence of these online dynamics, especially when crafting
rules which are meant to overcome market failures due to high
coordination costs. Yet another set of instances in which online
social networks affect law and policy is addressed by Lior
Strahilevitz. Strahilevitz demonstrates that in various instances
social norms, which are governed and enforced through robust
social networks, can substitute enforcement by the state (as it
would be cheaper and more effective).118 I leave the development
of these issues for future analyses.
III. PROMOTING ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS AND
NETWORKING: GENERAL
After setting out and acknowledging the benefits and
importance of the information flows within online social networks,
it is now time to examine how such dynamics could be maintained
and promoted. In this section I argue that these objectives could be
achieved by relying on proper law and policy responses. By legal
and policy responses one could refer to several processes and
outcomes; they could be regulations set in place to promote the
objectives outlined below. They could also be court rulings on
matters related to the information flows within or from social
networks. In my analysis below I mention both, while focusing on
the latter. I explain that the promotion of successful dynamics
within online social networks could be achieved by both
intervening and protecting these dynamics, and at times choosing
not to intervene and to allow existing market forces to resolve the
issue at hand.
As mentioned above, for the dynamics within these networks to
prosper and lead to the beneficial outcomes addressed above, three
general and foundational needs must be fulfilled: (1) independent,
trusted and impartial platforms for these social interactions must be
made available and accessible; (2) users must be motivated to join
in these social exchanges, both as passively seeking, gathering and
consuming the information, and at times providing, correcting, or
118

In the context of driving, see Strahilevitz, How is My Driving?, supra note 51, at
1719, or in the context of inappropriate behavior at parades, see Strahilevitz, Social
Norms, supra note 20, at 369.
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evaluating it; and (3) tools must be set in place to allow the
successful filtering and accreditation of the information, in a way
that is effective, and cannot be easily tampered with or gamed.
In this section, I will focus on issues (2) and (3). The first issue
has been discussed in detail by Benkler119 who addresses potential
bottlenecks throughout the telecommunications infrastructure in
general and in the Internet in particular. Benkler cautions against
allowing very few actors to control the physical infrastructure over
which Internet communications take place. To avoid the pitfalls of
this outcome, he suggests various forms of independent sources,
while referring to mesh Wi-Fi networks and municipal broadband.
He also promotes regulatory solutions such as “network neutrality”
policies.120 I refrain from elaborating on this issue, as the
arguments and suggestion set forth in the existing literature are
sufficient. Furthermore, it appears that there is no real problem of
lack of impartial and “neutral” social network platforms in
practice.121
A. Promoting and Maintaining Motivation
At the heart of the online social networking dynamic are the
users, who are motivated to contribute and participate for a variety
of (mostly internal) reasons. Such motivation is the key to
maintaining and potentially accelerating today’s level of
participation within social networks. There are several strategies
regarding the legal response to concern for assuring a high level of
motivation in these realms. One response might be that the law
should not interfere but should allow the dynamics to play out
based on market and social forces—which thus far have led to
satisfactory results. This response must be rejected—not because
it is wrong but because it is naïve. The legal environment
governing social networks and the individuals’ using it is bound to
affect user motivation and participation. Even though these
dynamics might seem to transpire outside the realm of the law, this
119

BENKLER, supra note 11, at 399–408.
See id.
121
As Benkler himself points out, a variety of online social networks use independent
platforms, and are free of the various battles for control transpiring on the layer below
(the “physical” layer, as opposed to the “logical” layer). Id. at 242.
120
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is rarely the case.122 The examples provided below demonstrate the
extent to which indirect legal measures can greatly affect these
motivations.
In addition to the indirect and at times unapparent effects and
influence of the law, actual and explicit steps to promote
motivation are possible as well. Such “active” (or “positive”)
response would call for the government to motivate individuals
externally to contribute and become active members within these
networks. The government could do this by providing direct
(simply paying) or indirect (tax breaks, for example) incentives to
participate, while structuring platforms of its own or relying on
those already in existence. While some scholars offer creative
models for such intervention in various contexts,123 I believe that
in most cases, such steps are not required. This is because of both
the relative success of existing motivational incentives, and the
fear that these forms of motivation could lead to several difficulties
and concerns.124 Once government began promoting actions and
speech within these realms, it would be faced with complaints and
suspicions that one form of speech and action was favored for a
variety of reasons and interests (as well as constant pressures to
show such favor at various junctures).
However, as mentioned, the law would have a substantial
effect on motivations through various indirect legal rules, which
reflect on the implications of user participation. These rules will
have an impact on individuals' willingness to contribute to the
online social discourse. One form of legal rules, which would
have a significant indirect effect, is those which address the ability

122

See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD Part V (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (countering some existing
arguments according to which the Internet is a borderless and order-less realm); see also
Becher & Zarsky, supra note 22, at 172–74.
123
In the context of generating a database that would include information which would
assist minorities seeking jobs, see Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination,
75 U. CHI. L. REV (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 10–12), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003001 [hereinafter Strahilevitz,
Privacy].
124
On the difficulties of these forms of “selective incentives” to create information
products, see PETER R. MONGE & NOSHIR S. CONTRACTOR, THEORIES OF
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 166–67 (Oxford Press 2003).
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of individuals to bring claims in tort against network participants,
with regard to their online activities. Such claims—that might
arise from their representations and communications in the online
realm—include libel, breach of privacy, fraud, harming business
reputation, and others.125 Expanding the users’ vulnerability to
such claims would require participants to exercise caution and
“chill” their participation within these networks.
As activity within these social networks expands, reports of
lawsuits over these matters multiply.126 Courts are developing
various tools and tests as to when participants in the online
discourse should be found liable, when their identity should be
revealed and the extent of their liability.127 Hereby I address
several instances in which courts should take into account the
benefits of online social networking and limit the reach of such
claims. That said, there is no reason to afford participants within
these realms immunity from the various existing torts which
govern the harm that mere uttering may cause others. Indeed,
there are many instances in which tort law (and possibly criminal
law) must be applied to the full against a network participant
whose words went too far.

125

I will not address in this context possible suits for IP infringement within these
realms.
126
See, for instance, Video Professor’s suit against one hundred “John Doe” posters on
various forums, claiming the violation of federal trademark laws, defamation and state
laws. Posting of Greg Beck to Consumer Law & Policy Blog,
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2007/09/video-professor.html (Sept. 21, 2007 14:44
EST); see also Dan Goodin, Software developer sues to muzzle website users, REGISTER,
Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/09/12/2clix_sues_site_over_critical_
comments (2Clix Australia’s suit against a site owner, claiming for “severe downturn in
sales” caused by comments anonymously posted to his site); see generally cyberSLAPP
Cases, http://www.cyberslapp.org/cases/index.cfm (listing of cases where internet
speakers were sued for their online speech, or where the identities of Internet speakers
were sought by subpoena).
127
For instance, see Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462–64 (Del. 2005). For a discussion
of the legal rules for revealing the user’s identity, and additional cases, see DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET
148–49 (2007).
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B. Liability for Incidental Contributions
In this Article, I choose to focus on the second tier of
participating users mentioned above—the 10% of users who do not
provide actual content but perform important yet incidental tasks,
such as grading, tagging and remarking on other posts and snippets
of information. Usually a discussion of the dynamics within social
networks focuses on the contribution, motivation, and liability of
the 1% of users who actively and directly contribute information
(and rightly so). Yet the incidental contributors play an important
role in the success of these networks and the achievement of the
positive outcomes outlined in Part II above. While playing this
role, they are less motivated than the actual active contributors.
They might not experience great pride in their contribution, and
will not be hailed by others for their promotion of knowledge in
the community (although their roles are significantly less taxing in
terns of time and attention).128 Therefore, there is even more
reason to examine whether their motivations are substantially
chilled in view of potential legal claims and liability.
To examine sufficiently the proper legal response to claims of
liability on the part of incidental contributors, I separately address
claims made by other community members (the “inner realm”) and
those made by individuals outside the network (the “outer
realm”).129 First, within the inner realm of the social networks,
participants might be aggrieved by others that have marked them
or their messages unfavorably. These actions might cause them
personal grief and even financial damages. For these reasons,
users might bring claims in court against these incidental
contributors.130 In this context I assert that courts should first

128
These users will still be moved to action by powerful motivators such as altruism and
in the case of a close online social network by willingness to contribute to the relevant
“community.”
129
See generally Tal Zarsky, Privacy and Data Collection in Virtual Worlds, in BALKIN
& NOVECK, STATE OF PLAY, supra note 10 (distinguishing the legal analysis of relations
within and outside online social networks in the context of privacy concerns in online
realms), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963889.
130
These aggrieved users are probably blocked from bringing actions in most cases
against the platforms themselves in view of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. For explanations as to the extent of the protection of this
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examine whether such users might find their remedy through other
means—such as turning to internal dispute resolution methods131
and providing online responses to the other users within the social
networks, while explaining (to them and the rest of the online
community) that they have been treated unfairly.132 In other
words, I would argue that courts should, when possible, require
parties to resolve these conflicts within the online network and
without bringing the parties into court.133
Following through with this recommendation sometimes leads
to a surprising yet essential recommendation: courts addressing
disputes among network participants over these issues should
favorably consider upholding and enforcing the Terms of Service
(and when relevant, End User License Agreement (EULA))134
provisions of the relevant social network platform, which might
refer plaintiffs to alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution.135
These agreements might set in place requirements for users to refer
first to various forms of arbitration or dispute resolution before

section in this context see the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) Bloggers’ FAQ,
http://w2.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-230.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
131
Examples include those available through eBay. For more on these methods, see
Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology’s Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigm for
Accountability in Mediation, 11 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 253–93 (2006). For a similar
recommendation made in the broader context of all claims regarding libel, see SOLOVE,
supra note 127, at 123–24 (arguing that to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits in this
context, the law should require a plaintiff first to exhaust informal mechanisms for
dealing with this problem).
132
Another issue arising in this context is whether the incidental contributor is indeed
liable in tort given his or her limited contribution. I leave the establishment of this point
to courts on a case-to-case basis.
133
Fairfield, supra note 29, at 12 (referring to these forms of claims as the “Magic
Circle” argument—according to which disputes within a “virtual world” should remain
within it and be resolved though internal measures). Fairfield addresses several
problematic elements with this argument. Yet this article considers one of its positive
aspects—the manner in which it promotes motivations to contribute to social networking
dynamics.
134
In the context of virtual worlds, for instance, the discourse among users is governed
by the EULA, to which the users provide assent at the time of registering for the game.
135
Note that some provisions establish choice of law and jurisdiction in realms that
might be problematic for some plaintiffs. I so not refer to these instances in the text. See
Feldman v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 966011, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007) (upholding
choice of law provisions).
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bringing an action against other users.136 Even though such
provisions might generate various legal difficulties,137 upholding
them has beneficial outcomes in the present context: it reassures
incidental contributors that the chance they will end up in court is
slim. It will keep disputes they are involved in (to a certain
degree) out of the courts, especially when the networks themselves
maintain existing means to resolve disputes fairly (and in many
cases, quickly and cheaply). Thus, it assists in maintaining a high
level of motivation for this form of essential participation in the
inner working of the social network.138
In addition to disputes in the “inner realm,” claims against
incidental contribution could be raised by those in the “outer
realm,” who are not in privity of contract with the network
136

See, for instance, the terms used by Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php
(last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (under the heading “Arbitration”) (“The sole and exclusive
forum and remedy for any and all disputes and claims relating in any way to or arising
out of these terms of use, the site and/or service . . . shall be final and binding
arbitration.”). This allows the defendant to argue that this contractual framework blocks
the plaintiff’s claim. eBay refers users to such processes as well, though it is unclear
whether the referral is mandatory or voluntary. See Resolving Disputes, eBay,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/problems-dispute-resolution.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2007). Furthermore, ebay recently introduced a “Community Court” to settle disputes
regarding reputation, and “respected” ebay community members serve as jurors. This
issue raises several thorny issues of contract law that I do not address at this juncture but
leave for future analyses.
137
Recently, scholars have pointed out several of the problematic aspects of these
contracts (which are usually not a result of the true assent of both negotiating parties).
See, for instance, Fairfield, supra note 29, at 28. Courts have, in several instances,
followed suit and set aside these contractual provisions. For instance, in the “Virtual
Worlds” context, see Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa.
2007). Even though I argue that upholding these contractual provisions proves helpful
and thus should be a preferred option, I do not disagree with the court’s ruling in Bragg.
In this case, the court found the relevant contractual sections unconscionable, given that
they were “buried” within the overall contract, required confidentiality in the
proceedings, and forced the plaintiff to incur heavy costs prior to initiating the arbitration
proceedings. However, absent these one-sided provisions, I believe courts should tend to
uphold these provisions.
138
The argument presented here is strengthened in a recent blog by David Hoffman,
who points to recent empirical data indicating a slump in participation in Wikipedia—
especially in lower-level tasks such as editing and correcting. He attributes this decline
to inefficiencies in Wikipedia’s dispute resolution systems which are pushing participants
away. See posting of David Hoffman to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/10/is_wikipedia_co.html (Oct. 11,
2007, 16:38 EST).
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platform. Here I refer to third parties who are addressed or
affected by the ongoing discourse in the social network.139 In this
context the users are not shielded by contractual terms (or subject
to internal community norms) that might channel the dispute away
from the courts. Yet here too I would recommend that courts
hesitate before allowing plaintiffs to drag these contributors into a
lengthy and costly litigation process. Before doing so, courts
should consider whether plaintiffs cannot receive sufficient
remedies from the active contributor, or whether they can turn to
other channels to resolve this dispute within the social network.140
Before concluding this issue, I offer a final point of
clarification and reemphasis. At this juncture the careful reader
might question the overall logic of the policy recommendations
mentioned above; why, in the interest of promoting the important
benefits of social networks, should courts pay special attention to
the protection of the rights of the incidental contributors, rather
than focusing on the active and direct contributors (and at times
preferring the protection of the former to the latter)? My response,
as mentioned before, is that even though the benefits from the
actions of the active contributors are very high, there are clear
incentives that will motivate them to continue to contribute.
Incidental contributors face a different “motivation calculus”—
even though their contribution is slight their incentives are limited,
so creating legal liability might chill this important dynamic.
139

These could be parties that are addressed in an unfavorable manner within this realm.
This could lead to dire consequences as this information is available to the network
participants, and, in many instances, to many others when indexed and referenced by
general search engines.
140
I acknowledge that by introducing these recommendations I am by no means adding
clarity to the complicated issue at hand. Much to the contrary, these recommendations
add complexity to the matter, as they require courts first to establish whether the
contribution at hand is substantial or merely incidental. However, I believe courts would
be able to resolve this issue on a case-by-case basis. For a similar position, see SOLOVE,
supra note 131. Additional legal tools which could promote the motivation of incidental
contributions to online social networks are various forms of Anti-SLAPP legislation:
laws adopted in several states (California, Oregon, Missouri, and others) that allow
defendants to argue for statutory damages in instances in which they are sued for voicing
their opinion in a public realm, regarding matters within the public interest. I hope to
address these measures and their relevance to the matters at hand in future writing. For
information on this issue, see California Anti-SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net. For a
list of California statutes and cases, see http://www.casp.net/mencal.html.
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However, it is clear that future research must examine the relations
of motivations, participation, and threats of legal remedies in the
context of incidental contributors, so that courts and policy makers
might be able to provide a proper response.
C. Filtering, Accreditation and Law
The accreditation of information distributed throughout the
online social network is a crucial element in the overall analysis of
information flow within these realms and their potential benefits.
Without such accreditation, the social network will collapse, users
will have no reason to collect this information and rely on it, and
others will lose all motivation to contribute to a network that
provides tainted results. Therefore, the entities providing the
platform for the online social networks are strongly motivated to
facilitate a successful and unbiased dynamic. The need for
accreditation is exacerbated in realms in which the information
flowing throughout these networks is bound to have commercial
implications;141 in these instances, various entities are greatly
concerned that certain forms of information will be graded
according to their interests. Such is the case in the two examples
addressed above in Part II; positive feedback on commercial
vendor-to-consumer transactions would be of great value to the
relevant seller; positive feedback regarding various forms of
content is extremely beneficial to the content owner142 and
affiliated advertisers. Therefore, in these instances, interested
parties will go to great lengths to manipulate the accreditation
systems set in place, so that the results reflect their objectives.143
141

Manipulation of the online discourse might also take place in view of political
interests, but I do not address this important issue in this article. There are examples of
politicians caught “tampering” with various Wikipedia entries. See John Borland, See
Who’s Editing Wikipedia—Diebold, the CIA, a Campaign, WIRED, Aug. 14, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/08/wiki_tracker;
Declan
McCullagh, Congress caught making false entries in Wikipedia, C|Net News.com, Jan.
30, 2006, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-6033082-7.html.
142
The right holder would reap benefits from viewing these materials through various
licensing schemes or imbedded advertisements.
143
Some examples of these practices, at times called “sock puppetry,” are evident in
news reports. See Frank Ahrens, Puppets Emerge as Internet’s Effective, and Deceptive
Salesman,
WASH.
POST,
Oct.
7,
2006,
at
D01,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/06/AR2006100601742.html;
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They will strive to “magnify” their presence throughout the
network, and in that way overcome the accreditation systems
premised on the “wisdom of the crowds.”144
Social networks step in to meet the challenges of accreditation
using various strategies. The entities controlling the platforms
construct technological mechanisms for accreditation, and apply
several methods to limit its gaming.145 They apply sophisticated
analyses to identify trends of normal and abnormal data flow, and
move to block the latter.146 Yet, because of the powerful
incentives to engage in such manipulation, an arms race is
developing between the social networks and those striving to
manipulate their data flow—the results of which are impossible to
predict at this early juncture. Therefore, beyond the technological
steps set in place to enhance accreditation and reduce gaming,
there is room and need for the intervention of the law.
As opposed to the previous analysis regarding motivation, in
this context I believe the state should play an active role in
promoting the objective at hand. I briefly explain here what and
how this should be done. Thereafter, I briefly explain why this
should be a role for the state.
The state should take a proactive role in battling gaming
practices transpiring in social networks and move to bring legal
action against those engaging in these practices. In doing so, the
state could rely on existing legal doctrines and laws, such as fraud,
misrepresentation and various laws addressing unfair business
practices.147 In addition, specific rules might be required and are
Brad Stone & Matt Richtel, The Hand That Controls the Sock Puppet Could Get Slapped,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/technology/
16blog.html.
144
Since the manipulators will artificially control many voices, they are able to create
the appearance that the “crowd” is in fact voting in their favor. For descriptions of these
practices, see Annalee Newitz, Herding the Mob, WIRED, Mar. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/15.03/herding.html.
145
See, for instance, Benkler’s description of Slashdot and the “Karma” mechanism.
BENKLER, supra note 11, at 75–80.
146
For a discussion on how this is done by Google in the context of their battle against
search engine optimizing, see Zarsky, Denver, supra note 53, at nn.160, 161, 193.
147
Such as § 5 of the FTC Act which declares “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce” to be illegal. This provision could easily be applied in some of the
contexts mentioned in the text (such as e-commerce), and might be more difficult to
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indeed set in place in some jurisdictions. For instance, according
to press reports, the UK plans to adopt in the very near future
“anti-sock puppet” regulation. Such regulation will prohibit and
sanction interested parties, who praise their own products without
mentioning their ulterior motive.148
Yet perhaps the most important role for the state would lie in
enforcing existing and newly enacted laws. These objectives
would require labor, funding, and technological sophistication
which would best be concentrated within one federal agency. At
first glance, in the US, the FTC seems to be a strong candidate for
concentrating all the required expertise in one place.149
To be sure, these proposals will encounter many challenges.
First, enforcing these laws will call for technical sophistication in
identifying manipulative practices, recording them, and finding
those behind them. Next, jurisdictional problems will surely arise
as the “gamers” and “sock puppeteers” flee to jurisdictions that do
not sanction the manipulative practices here addressed—leading to
the need for an international scheme and effort. Finally, state
actions focused on the silencing of accrediting voices—even if
they are manipulative in nature—will be sure to raise difficult legal
questions. Courts would be confronted with questions as to the free
speech rights of the commercial entities promoting various
products and ideas within these social networks. In addition,
policy makers will have to make difficult decisions when striving
to distinguish manipulative conduct from enthusiastic (yet
somewhat exaggerated and wrong) backing of products, services,
and opinions. These challenges should be met after substantial
apply to others (such as the distribution of content and media). I will return to the
important role the FTC should play in this context below.
148
Sam Coates, Fake bloggers soon to be ‘named and shamed’, THE TIMES, Feb. 10,
2007, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article1361968.ece.
This legislation resulted from The E.U. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Council
Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:149:0022:0039:EN:PDF, that prohibits a professional
trader from “falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for
purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself
as a consumer.” Id. at Annex I, ¶22.
149
A problematic test case for this matter is the role of the FTC as an enforcer of
privacy. For a discussion of this issue, see SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 750 (Aspen 2006).
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legal research. At this point, I can merely hope that this gap in
scholarship would be filled quickly so to enable relevant legal
response in the near future.
However, even in view of these substantial technological and
legal challenges I believe that the state must play a central role in
battling these forms of manipulation: first, leaving this role in the
hands of private parties might lead to problematic outcomes. The
entities controlling the virtual networks might be too successful in
their attempt to block manipulative content; they might apply
filtering mechanisms that weed out not only the bogus messages
but also those made by good-faith users as well. At times these
forms of private filtering might merely be an excuse for silencing
unwanted voices. These outcomes will in fact negate the many
benefits of the social networks mentioned above: they are realms in
which all users can participate and where ideas are discussed by
everyone in a free and democratic fashion. The unfortunate users
who are to be silenced in this realm have almost no form of
recourse against the private entity operating these networks, this
being a private party not subject to “public form”—like rules and
restrictions.150
Second, the sheer force of the state might lead to quicker and
better results than private action. The private entities might be
successful in blocking messages that resulted from manipulative
practices.
However, the state could pursue the “gamers”
themselves and through various disciplinary steps, ensure they will
cease their activity.151

150

For instance, see Murawski v. Pataki, 2007 WL 2781054 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007);
Posting of Eric Goldman to Tech & Marketing Law, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2007/09/askcom_not_liab.htm (Sept. 27, 2007). For a different perspective on
this issue in legal scholarship, see Beth S. Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social
Construction of Trust: Creating the Legal Framework for On-Line Identity, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1733, 1756 & n.92, 1759 n.101 (2005) (and quoted references).
151
Note that a somewhat different conclusion has been set forth by the European
Network and Information Security Agency. In their Position Paper, Security Issues and
Recommendations for Online Social Networks, they recommend, among other things that
social networks “Maximise Possibilities for Reporting and Detecting Abuse.” They also
“encourage the use of reputation techniques.” The recommendations set forth in this
article go beyond the recommendations in the position paper and explain how law should
move to increase accreditation when these steps are insufficient. See Giles Hogben,
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To conclude this section of policy recommendations, I wish to
clarify that the two recommendations just made, both of which
largely focus on the incidental contributor to social networks, do
not contradict. On the face of it, one might argue a conflict
between the two; I first call for a lenient, “the-social-networkswill-solve-it” approach to these incidental contributions (and the
actual contributors) while urging courts to let dispute resolution
mechanisms resolve various disagreements. Then I call for
extensive governmental intervention (as opposed to relying on
market forces) to make certain that these contributions are not
maliciously tainted. However, these recommendations need not
conflict. They call for the active intervention of courts and the
state only in instances in which the users’ actions might create
falsifications and distortions that the market itself is unable to
correct, given the inherent vulnerabilities of the technology. In
other instances, social networks and data flows should be left to
their own devices. Yet I concede that differentiating these
instances might not always be easy—and carrying out such
differentiation is a challenge that courts and regulators will be
required to meet in years to come.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article I address an intriguing and important social and
technological development: the emergence of online social
networks. As I explained above, these networks now attract
participation by an expanding realm of users. Throughout the
Article I demonstrate the important role law should have both in
promoting these dynamics, and in adapting other realms of law to
these new developments. Above all, two conclusions arise. First,
that social and technological change is occurring at great speed,
and it requires law and policy to react appropriately. Such reaction
might call for unconventional steps and outcomes; yet those should
not be overruled without proper contemplation. Second, many of
the complex issues at hand require additional research and inquiry,
including empirical studies that will help to establish the role of
Security Issues and Recommendations for Online Social Networks (Oct. 2007), available
at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_pp_social_networks.pdf.
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law and the impact of social networks. I can only hope these two
needs are fulfilled and that I may contribute to their fulfillment in
the future.

